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DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO ATTEND A PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE AND THE USE OF SANCTIONS
AT PREPARATORY STAGES OF LITIGATION*
RULE 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to direct
the attorneys of parties to appear at a pre-trial conference.' Although setting
out the objectives of the pre-trial conference and some of the procedures relat-
ing to its conduct, the Rule does not prescribe sanctions for noncompliance
with court orders issued pursuant to its provisions. Thus it gives a court no
direction for treating a failure by a party's attorney to appear as ordered at a
pre-trial conference. The recent Supreme Court decision in Link v. Wabash
R.R.,2 however, affirming a district court's sua spontc dismissal 3 of a plain-
tiff's cause of action for his attorney's failure to attend the conference, indicates
that courts may take an antipathetic view of such failures. This view not only
stands in marked contrast with the response of the courts to noncompliance
by a party with orders issued at another stage of the pre-trial process, dis-
covery, but also seems inappropriate where a party is not responsible for his
attorney's nonappearance.
*Link v. Wabash R.R, 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 16: Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties
to appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings
to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference,
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties
as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered
controls the subsequent course of the actio, unless modified at the trial to prevent
manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial cal-
endar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may
either confine the calendar to jury actions or to non-jury actions or extend it to all
actions.
See generally 3 MooRs, FEmAL PRAcrrcE 16 (2d ed. 1948).
2. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
3. For the district court order of dismissal, see Link v. Wabash R.R., 291 F.2d 542,
543 (7th Cir. 1961):
Pursuant to the inherent powers of the Court, and upon failure of plaintiff's counsel
to appear at a pre-trial, which was scheduled... pursuant to notice, under Rule 12
[local rule], counsel having failed to give any good and sufficient reason for not ap-
pearing at said pre-trial, the cause is now dismissed.
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Shortly before the scheduled conference in the Link case, which was set pur-
suant to a court order issued two weeks earlier, plaintiff's attorney telephoned
the judge's chambers to ask for a short postponement on the ground that he was
busily filing papers with another court. 4 Although the attorney had 11o indica-
tion that the district court would reject his request or find his explanation
unsatisfactory, a dismissal order was entered that same afternoon when the
attorney failed to appear.5 A new suit was effectively barred, if not by prejudice
attaching to the dismissal, then by the statute of limitations.0 Both the Seventh
Circuit and the Supreme Court held that the district court's sua sponlc dis-
missal of a party's cause of action for his attorney's nonappearance was with-
in the discretion of the lower court. However, the two courts characterized the
case differently. The court of appeals assumed that the sanction was imposed
for the attorney's failure to appear as ordered,8 while the Supreme Court held
that the dismissal was because of a want of prosecution by the plaintiff, as evi-
denced in part by the attorney's failure to attend, and by the protracted history
of the litigation.9 Reliance upon a want of prosecution theory in this case seems
dubious, since much of the delay prior to the scheduled conference was caused
by the defendant as well as the plaintiff.10 By basing its affirmance of the dis-
missal order on want of prosecution, for which dismissal seems an appropriate
sanction, the Supreme Court avoided deciding the more difficult question of
whether dismissal would also be an appropriate sanction where a failure to
comply with a court order to attend a conference was the only ground of dis-
missal."1
4. Id. at 544-45.
5. Id. at 544.
6. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 637 n.1 (1962). Since the effect of the disissal
was to deprive plaintiff of his potentially valuable negligence claim against defendant rail-
road, the absence of notice as to the possibility of dismissal and the failure to hold an ad-
versary hearing raised the question of the constitutional propriety of the court's action. Id.
at 632-33.
7. 291 F2d at 546; 370 U.S. at 633.
8. 291 F.2d at 545-46. Counsel for the defendant made no effort in the Court of Appeals
to rely upon a want of prosecution theory as a ground for the involuntary dismissal. Tie
only references to "want of prosecution" in the Seventh Circuit's opinion are parenthetical,
describing the holding of the court in another case, and Rule 41(b), indicating the avail-
ability of the dismissal power under that circumstance. The Court of Appeals made no at-
tempt, however, to rest its affirmance of the district court's decision on that case nor on
Rule 41(b).
9. [W]e are unable to say that the District Court's dismissal of this action for failure
to prosecute, as evidenced only partly by the failure of petitioner's counsel to appear
at a duly scheduled pre-trial conference, amounted to an abuse of discretion.
370 U.S. at 633.
10. Although it appears, as the Supreme Court assumed, that the district judge may
have considered the age of the suit, the oldest civil case on his court docket (6 years), In
rendering his dismissal, id. at 628, the judge and the defendant appeared at least as much to
blame for previous delays as plaintiff or his attorney. Not only did the judge render a judg-
ment on the pleadings for the defendant, but the defendant also requested one of the con-
tinuances in the case while not objecting to the plaintiff's own request. See 370 U.S. at
628.
11. Id. at 634.
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Neither the Supreme Court nor the court of appeals relied on the Federal
Rules as the source of the district court's power to dismiss; rather, the dis-
missal was found to be based upon a court's "inherent power to enforce its
rules, orders, or procedures, and to impose appropriate sanctions for failure to
comply."' 2 However, the Court noted that Rule 41 (b)-which, upon motion of
a defendant, authorizes a dismissal for "failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of court" 3 -- supports the district court's
dismissal for failure to prosecute. But the Court refused to hold the Rule appli-
cable because the defendant had not moved for dismissal below.14 The refusal
to apply Rule 41(b) on this ground seens questionable, since the absence of
defendant's motion in the court below seems a mere formality which should it-
self not bar application of the Rule. Indeed it has been held that Rule 41(b)
applies in the absence of a defendant's motion.r5 In characterizing the dismissal
as one for a want of prosecution and in refusing to rely upon Rule 41(b),
the Court apparently wanted to avoid holding that the failure of a party's
counsel to attend a scheduled pre-trial conference itself should result in a dis-
missal of a plaintiff's cause of action under Rule 41 (b), which is the only sanc-
tion available under this rule.
Although the absence of a defendant's motion under Rule 41(b) is not a
convincing reason why the Rule should not be found to apply to situations
where the plaintiff's attorney fails to attend the pre-trial conference, there are
persuasive reasons supporting its inapplicability. Since the direction to the at-
torney to appear is an "order of court" with which the attorney and presumably
the plaintiff has failed to comply,' 6 a literal reading of Rule 41(b) supports
the conclusion that it does apply and thus warrants the sanction of dismissal.
But the application of the failure to comply with orders of the court provision
of Rule 41 (b) has been limited, perhaps because the rule only provides for the
sanction of dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.' 7 Thus, generally, its use has been
12. 291 F.2d at 545; 370 U.S. at 630. That courts have such power is not open to
question. Traditionally, courts have utilized this inherent power at various stages of litiga-
tion to prevent abuses and injustices, thereby assuring the proper administration and control
of the judicial process. See 1 MooazE, FEDERAL. PRacrcE 0.60[6] (2d ed. 1948).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) : Involuntary Dimnissal: Effect Thereof.
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against
him. ... Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal
under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an adjudication
upon the merits.
14. 370 U.S. at 629.
15. See cases cited in 5 Mooaa. FEDERAL PRAcnTcE f 41.11(2), at 1036 n.8 (2d ed.
1948).
16. 291 F.2d at 545.
17. Since Rule 41(b) is located in the Trials section of the Federal Rules, its applica-
bility for noncompliance with court orders issued at pre-trial has been questioned. The
Supreme Court said in Societi Internationale v. Rogers, 357 US. 197, 207 (1958) :
In our opinion, whether a court has power to dismiss a complaint because of
non-compliance with a production order depends exclusively upor Rule 37 .... There
19631
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restricted to instances where a dismissal is explicitly authorized under other
provisions of the Federal Rules.18 For example, Rule 41(b) has been relied
upon in dismissing an action for a failure to comply with a court order requir-
ing greater specificity in the pleadings.1 9 For failure to comply with such an
order, Rule 12(e) explicitly provides for the striking of the pleadings to which
the motion was directed.20 Moreover, Rule 41(b) has been used to dismiss
where a party refused to comply with a court order requiring the payment of
costs of a previously dismissed action based upon the same claim.2 1 A dismissal
in these circumstances is also authorized by the Rules.22 Rule 41 (b) has also
been used to dismiss an action for failure to attend a pre-trial conference, but
in this case there was also a want of prosecution, which ground, if proven, clear-
ly justifies a dismissal." In fact, the bulk of cases in which Rule 41 (b) has been
relied upon are situations where the plaintiff or his attorney has engaged in
dilatory tactics, constituting a failure to prosecute. 24 Thus, the situations to
which Rule 41(b) has been applied do not indicate that the Rule warrants dis-
missal where a court order issued pursuant to Rule 16 requiring attendance at
a scheduled conference has been disobeyed, since Rule 16 does not explicitly
authorize dismissal or a stay of the action for noncompliance with an order of
is no need to resort to 41(b), which appears in that part of the Rules concerned with
trials and which lacks such specific references to discovery.
See also Russo v. Sofia Bros., 2 F.R.D. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (Rule 41(b) primarily con-
trols the action at or after trial and does not apply to a dismissal of the complaint for in-
sufficient pleading).
18. E.g., First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957); Blake v. DeVilbiss, 118 F.2d 346 (6th Cir.
1941) ; Botkins v. Sorter, 29 F. Supp. 991 (W.D. La. 1939) ; Martin. v. Southern Ry., 1
F.R.D. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1939) ; cf. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 156 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
19. Blake v. DeVilbiss, 118 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1941) ; Botkins v. Sorter, 29 F. Supp.
991 (W.D. La. 1939).
20. FEn. R. Civ. P. 12(e) : Motion for More Definite Statement.
If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous
that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, lie may
move for a more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The
motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion
is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the
order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the plead-
ing to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
21. Martin v. Southern Ry., 1 F.R.D. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1939).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(d): Costs of Previously-Dismissed Action.
If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action
based upon, or including the same claim against the same defendant, the court may
make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it
may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has
complied with the order.
23. Wisdom v. Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Ala. 1939).
24. E.g., Janousek v. French, 287 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Ordinance Gauge Co. v.
Jacquard Knitting Mach. Co., 265 F.2d 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959);
Red Warrior Coal & Mining Co. v. Boron, 12 F.R.D. 10 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Giovanettl v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 22 F.R.D. 493 (D.D.C. 1958); Lynch v. National Bondholders
Corp., 2 F.R.D. 376 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
[Vol, 72:819
SANCTIONS AT PRETRIAL STAGES
court issued pursuant to it. Furthermore, since Rule 41 (b) is available only to
a defendant,25 and since there is no counterpart of this Rule for a plaintiff, it
would seem that it was not intended to apply to court orders which could be
disobeyed by defendants as well as by plaintiffs. Providing for no alternative
but dismissal, Rule 41(b) seems inappropriate when applied to the pre-trial
conference phase; the possibility at this stage of a variety of transgressions
varying in severity by both plaintiff and defendant would seem to require a
broader array of sanctions.26 It might therefore be appropriate to look at the
criteria governing the imposition of sanctions for noncompliance with orders
of court at another pre-trial stage, discovery, in determining the propriety of
applying severe sanctions for noncompliance with orders issued pursuant to
Rule 16.
In contrast to the one alternative in Rule 41(b), Rule 37, which governs the
imposition of sanctions at the discovery stage, enumerates a list of sanctions,
varying in severity, to be imposed for a party's noncompliance with the dis-
covery rules or with orders of court issued pursuant to them.27 With one ex-
ception,28 however, Rule 37 does not specify criteria for selecting the sanction
to be imposed in any particular instance of noncompliance. Although discovery
operates primarily through private accommodation between the parties out-
side the ambit of the court,29 generally the sanctions listed in Rule 37 cannot
be imposed prior to the issuance of a court order requiring a party to answer
a particular question in a deposition or an interrogtory, to produce documents
or allow the inspection and copying of documents, or to submit to a physical
or mental examination.3" The only situation where a sanction may be imposed
25. See note 13 supra.
26. Instances of noncompliance may include a tardy filing of pre-trial memoranda in
preparation for the conference, failure to attend the conference, or attendance at the con-
ference without adequate preparation.
27. Fan. R. Civ. P. 37.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d) : Failure of Party to Attend or Serve Ansuers.
If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or
fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper ser-
vice of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice may strike out all or
any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party.
29. Kaufman, Judicial Control Over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 116 (1962).
30. FEn. R. Civ. P. 37(b): Failure to Comply With Order.
(1) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to an-
swer any question after being directed to do so by the court in the district in which
the deposition is being taken, the refusal may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Other Consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party
refuses to obey an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule requiring him to
answer designated questions, or an order made under Rule 34 to produce any docu-
ment or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be
done, or to permit entry upon land or other property or an order made under Rule
35 requiring him to submit to a physical or mental e.xamination, the court may make
such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:
1963]
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in the absence of a court order is where a party, after proper notice by the
opposing party, "wilfully" fails to appear before the officer who is to take his
deposition or fails to serve answers to interrogatories 1 Section (d) of Rule
37, which applies solely to the latter situation, is the only part of Rule 37 which
provides a criterion determining the appropriateness of a particular sanction.
It reserves the use of the drastic sanctions of dismissal or entry of a default
judgment for occasions where a party "wilfully" fails to attend the taking of his
deposition or to serve answers to interrogatories. Although the reports of the
framers of the Federal Rules do not indicate the rationale for the inclusion of
this criterion in Rule 37(d) and not in Rule 37(b), which enumerates sanctions
available for all the other instances of noncompliance with discovery orders, its
incorporation there is not inexplicable. Because of the de-emphasized role of
pleadings characteristic of the Federal Rules,8 2 discovery was deemed essential
as a means of facilitating ascertainment of the facts and disclosure of positions
relied upon by the parties, thereby assisting the determination of the substantive
rights of parties on the merits.8 3 In short, discovery was, and still is, viewed as
a means to an end. Thus courts can utilize the drastic sanctions previously
mentioned prior to the issuance of a court order only when noncompliance is
expressed by a wilful defiance of a notice for the taking of a deposition or the
serving of interrogatories, an attitude suggestive of an unwillingness to assist
in any disclosure of facts or issues. Since the inexcusable conduct of the non-
complying party renders future participation and assistance in the discovery
(i) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked, or the
character or description. of the thing or land, or the contents of the paper, or the
physical or mental condition of the party, or any other designated facts shall be taken
to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the
party obtaining the order;
(ii) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose desig-
nated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated
documents or things or items of testimony, or.from introducing evidence of physical
or mental condition;
(iii) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(iv) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in, addition thereto, an order direct-
ing the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
31. See note 28 supra.
32. See 3 MooRE, FEDzERAL PRACTIcE 16.05, at 1106 (2d ed. 1948) ; Clark, Sili~plified
Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456-58 (1943).
33. See 4 MooRs, op. cit. supra note 32, ff 26.07, at 1078. The Supreme Court int Hick-
man v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947), clearly recognized the vital role of' discovery:
The new rules ... restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and
invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial,
The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-
trial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties,
and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or
whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues. Thus civil trials in the federal courts
no longer need be carried on in the dark....
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process unlikely, he is at that point denied the opportunity to have his rights
determined upon the merits.
Although not incorporated in Rule 37(b),34 the courts have not limited the
wilful violation criterion of Rule 37(d) to situations where a party fails to at-
tend the taking of his deposition or to serve answers to interrogatories, but
have used it to govern the imposition of sanctions for other instances of non-
compliance with discovery procedures. Thus, for instance, courts have utilized
this standard when faced with noncompliance with orders for the production
of documents, orders for a physical examination of a party, and orders com-
pelling an answer to a specific question.3 5 Although there is no unanimity
among the federal courts concerning the adoption of the standard in these latter
areas,3 6 in most of those cases of noncompliance where the question of wilful-
ness has been mentioned or litigated, courts have refused to employ the drastic
sanctions of dismissal or default judgment in the absence of a finding of a wilful
noncompliance.37 This attitude on the part of the courts that have incorporated
the wilful violation criterion in Rule 37(b) seems to rest on the propositions
34. See note 30 supra.
35. E.g., Roth v. Paramount Pictures Distrib. Corp., 8 F.R.D. 31 (W.D. Pa. 1948);
Campbell v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y, 1951); Newcomb v. Universal Match
Corp., 27 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). The court, in the Roth case, in the absence of a
finding of a wilful violation of its production order for certain specified books, denied, inter
alia, defendants' motion to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Similarly, the
court, in the Campbell case, denied defendant's motion for art order to preclude the plaintiff
from contradicting an affirmative defense where the evidence failed to show a wilful viola-
tion to comply with the court's production order for records which might have proved crucial
to the defendant in- establishing his defense. Perhaps cognizant of the fact that the use of
a preclusion order might prejudice a noncomplying party's case severely, the court main-
tained that only in an exceptional instance is the imposition of a preclusion order justified:
Rule 37(b) ... does not by its wording require that before an order of preclusion
may be made there must be a finding of wilful failure to comply with an order of
discovery. It seems, however, that only in ar exceptional case would such an order
be justified, and that absent wilful disobedience there must be proof of gross indif-
ference to the rights of the adverse party ...
101 F. Supp. at 707. See also Hinson v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 275 F2d 537 (5th Cir.
1960) (failure to attend physical examination pursuant to court order must have been vl-
ful to justify dismissal) ; Valenstein v. Bayonne Bolt Corp., 6 F.R.D. 363 (E.D.N.Y. 1946)
(wilful disposal of bolts ordered to be produced resulted in, striking of plaintiff's complaint
in part) ; accord, Bourne, Inc. v. Romero, 23 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. La. 1959) (failure to produce
documents, coupled with complete unwillingness to participate in pre-trial conference and
other discovery procedure, resulted in entry of default judgment).
36. Bernat v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (preclusion, order
entered in absence of a finding of wilful violation of production order) ; United States v.
Cotton Valley Operators Comm'n, 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 940 (1950)
(complaint dismissed in absence of a finding of a wilful violation of production order) ;
accord, Mooney v. Central Motor Lines, 222 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1955) (motion to amend
dismissal with prejudice, entered in absence of mention of wilful violation of court's order
to submit to a physical examination, to dismissal without prejudice denied). In the Mooney
case, though the court did not call the noncomplying party's conduct wilful, it might be
deemed such.
37. See notes 35-36 supra. A holding in contempt presupposes a wilful act.
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that discovery is but a way-station in the conduct of litigation, and that the im-
position of a drastic sanction for non-wilful violations would be to thwart the
underlying purpose of the Rules :38 the determination of the substantive rights
of parties on the merits.
Many federal courts, cognizant of this latter consideration, are solicitous and
tolerant of less than wilful transgressions, such as the neglectful failure of a
party to attend a deposition hearing or to furnish specified documents 0 Rather
than employ a drastic sanction, such as the entry of a default judgment or a
dismissal of a complaint, these courts have preferred to rely on conditional
orders providing for dismissal or judgment only if the noncompliance con-
tinues.40 And where the failure of a party to answer an interrogatory or attend
a deposition hearing is caused by neglect on the part of his attorney, some
courts have treated such noncompliance as non-wilful and thus not warranting
the ultimate sanction of dismissal.4 ' In these circumstances courts have also
used a conditional dismissal order. And even a wilful noncompliance has been
thought to merit a reprieve in the form of a conditional order, 42 a disposition
exemplifying the more lenient treatment of noncompliance at this stage of the
proceedings.
38. Holtzoff, Origins and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 1057, 1059 (1955):
The underlying philosophy of the new procedure may be said to consist of two dis-
tinct strands. The first is a shift of emphasis from rigid adherence to a prescribed
procedure to a distinct effort to bring about the disposition of every case on the
merits without regard to compliance with detailed requirements of adjective law and
overlooking any discrepancy or error that does not actually affect the substantive
rights of the parties....
39. See, e.g., Maresco v. Lambert, 2 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Haskell v. Phila-
delphia Transp. Co., 19 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1956). Where neglectful disregard of a notice
to attend a deposition hearing by plaintiff's attorney resulted in plaintiff's failure to attend,
the court, in the Maresco case, denied defendant's motion to dismiss on condition that plain'-
tiff pay costs of opposing party's counsel fees arising from the inconvenience suffered.
40. E.g., Terry Carpenter, Ltd. v. Ideal Cement Co., 117 F. Supp. 441 (D. Neb. 1954);
Pierre v. Bernuth, Lenbcke Co., 21 F.R.D. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Socha v. Webber, 11
F.R.D. 124 (D. Alaska 1951) ; Dann v. Compagnie Generale Trans-Atlantique, Ltd., 29 F.
Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); cf. Millinocket Theatre, Inc. v. Kurson, 35 F. Supp. 754 (D.
Me. 1940).
41. E.g., United Sheeplined Clothing Co. v. Arctic Fur Cap Corp., 165 F. Supp. 193
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (where defendant's failure to attend a deposition hearing was due to his
attorney's neglect, court denied plaintiff's motion for default judgment on condition that
defendant's attorney pay resulting costs to plaintiff, including reasonable attorney fees) ;
Dunn v. Pennsylvania R.R., 96 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (conditional order of dis-
missal entered, in action removed from state court, where failure of plaintiff to answer
interrogatories was due to his attorney's ignorance of practice in federal courts) ; Maresco
v. Lambert, 2 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); cf. Millinocket Theatre, Inc. v. Kurson, 35
F. Supp. 754 (D. Me. 1940). But cf. Alevizopoulos v. Central Am. Agency, Inc., 21 Fr..
RULEs Smav. 37b.243 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1955). In addition to the use of conditional orders
where noncompliance is caused by the actions of the attorney, courts have directed sanc-
tions at the lawyer rather than at the unoffending client. See, e.g., Allen v. United States,
16 FD, RULES SERy, 37b.211 caS 1 (E.D, Pa. May. 21, 1951). See also note 54 infra.
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It might be argued that the wilful violation standard and the conditional
order dispositions utilized at discovery have no application to the pre-trial con-
ference stage. Since discovery operates principally outside the ambit of the
court,43 with the judge engaged only in a supervisory role,44 the effects of non-
compliance with the discovery rules, as, for example, a notice to appear at a
deposition hearing, are the opposing party's inconvenience, the possibility of
attendant counsel fees, and the additional expense of filing a motion with the
court for an order compelling compliance with the desired mode of discovery
procedure. On the other hand, since the pre-trial conference takes place under
the close and active supervision of the judge, 5 noncompliance with an order
to attend the conference has a far more serious consequence. In addition to the
inconvenience suffered by the opposing party and the additional counsel fees
necessary to obtain a court order, noncompliance at this phase disrupts the
calendar of the court. Since other conferences might have been scheduled for
that time, noncompliance with the court order thus results in a significant social
cost, especially in light of the present congestion of court dockets."4 Further-
more, while discovery operates in a protracted setting, frequently involving the
employment of discovery devices over a considerable length of time, the pre-
trial conference ordinarily occupies a much briefer time span, generally less than
a day. But to rely on these distinctions as dispositive of the possible applica-
bility of the sanctional guidelines employed at discovery is to focus on the fact
that the court's closer involvement in the pre-trial conference phase warrants
a more severe treatment of noncompliance without considering the fundamental
similarities between the two pre-trial stages.
Both proceedings are designed to expedite litigation through the clarifica-
tion and simplification of issues and to assist in the possible disposition of a case
short of trial.4 7 Discovery enables a party to learn the basis of the positions
42. Saltzman v. Birrell, 156 F. Supp. 538, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
43. See note 29 supra.
44. FFD. R. Civ. P. 30(b) & (d).
45. See 3 MooRs, FEnDE.A PRAcTicx 16.11 (2d ed. 1948).
46. Olney, An Analysis of the Docket Congestion in the U.S. District Courts in the
Light of the Enactment of the Omnibus Judgeship Bill, 29 F.R.D. 217 (1962).
Against this backdrop of overcrowded dockets, noncompliance with a court order by
failure to attend a scheduled conference becomes equated with delay. See In re 1203, Inc.,
3 Fan. Rurm.s Sav. 2d. 16.43, case 1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 1960). And the effect of such failure
is to destroy the usefulness of the pre-trial conference as a device to promote the expedition
of litigation, thereby reducing the docket congestion. Recognizing this administrative bur-
den, courts could consider severe treatment of noncompliance with an order to attend a
conference at this stage of pre-trial a justifiable response to the needs of the system. Thus,
a district court in Pennsylvania, in deciding to refer the entire action to a referee in bank-
ruptcy, held that the bankrupt's failure to appear at a pre-trial conference or to offer any
reasonable excuse for its absence constituted a waiver of its right to jury trial, and said:
If pre-trial conferences are to be of any benefit in aiding the court to dispose of
its business, they must be treated seriously. Neither counsel nor their clients may be
permitted to trifle with the court and thus string out cases that should be disposed
of promptly. In no other way can we clean up our backlog of cases.
Id. at 291.
47. See note 4$ supra.
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maintained by his adversary; and, by disclosing the substantial points of dispute
between the parties, serves to clarify the basic issues of the case.48 Similarly,
the pre-trial conference promotes the narrowing of issues by providing a con-
ciliatory atmosphere in which the parties, under the supervision and direction
of a judge, are able to apprise themselves more fully of the basic issues at hand
and to eliminate their insignificant points of disagreement.49 Again, just as the
use of discovery, by providing materials outside of the pleadings on which to
support a claim or defense, enables a court to render a summary judgment and
thereby dispose of a case short of trial,50 so the conference, by promoting volun-
tary settlements, serves this end.rl Further, both discovery and the pre-trial
conference operate in a procedural system designed to eliminate the plethora
of technical motions and victories based on technical errors existing tinder the
earlier practice.52 Yet if transgressions at pre-trial stages can lead to the im-
position of a drastic sanction at each instance of noncompliance, the advantages
of the system can become lost in a barrage of cross-motions for dismissal fol-
lowing each technical error in the hope of an easy victory without reaching the
merits.
These similarities between the two pre-trial procedures suggest that the use
of the wilful violation criterion and conditional orders, less harsh in their im-
pact upon the party than immediate dismissal, might be more appropriate
methods to deal with noncompliance with court orders at the pre-trial confer-
ence. The importation of such a standard would indicate recognition of the fact
that to penalize litigants too severely for each instance of noncompliance is to
place too high a premium on the conference as an end in itself. In addition to
recognizing that the pre-trial conference is primarily designed to facilitate the
trial, not to prevent it, adoption of this criterion would afford due weight to
the concept of "fairness" implicit in the requirement that there be a wilful or
contumacious act before the drastic sanctions of dismissal or default judgment
are employed. Moreover, the use of a conditional order of dismissal, stating
that the order will become final unless the noncomplying party fulfills the re-
48. See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACtiCE 16.05 (2d ed. 1948).
49. For a discussion of the court's role in simplifying issues at the pre-trial conference,
see Note, The Role of the Court in Simplifying the Triable Issues at the Pre-Trial Coll.
ference, 72 YALE L.J. 383 (1962). A method often used by attorneys to eliminate their minor
points of disagreement is to stipulate them out of the case entirely.
50. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c) & (d).
51. See 3 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 48, 16.17, at 1123:
[O]ne of the most valuable functions of the pre-trial conference is, or can be,
the promotion of voluntary settlements.
Moreover, the narrowing of issues expedites the litigation process by reducing the amount
of time needed at trial for consideration of a case.
52. See note 38 mspra. Furthermore, the pre-trial conference can also be viewed as
operating in a rather protracted setting. The necessary preparation for the conference it-
self, involving the early filing with the court of pre-trial memoranda on the issues and facts
in dispute; the entry of a pre-trial order specifying the results reached in. the conference;
and the use of a number of conferences, a predominant practice in the "big" cases, all con-
tribute to protraction of the pre-trial conference phase.
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quirements of the court order within a stated period of time, such as attendance
at the conference, seems an efficacious alternative disposition. Since the time
limitation in the order may be quite short, delay resulting from the postpone-
ment of the conference would be minimal. As a basis for the use of a drastic
sanction at the pre-trial conference phase--one which eliminates the noncom-
plying party's opportunity to wage a trial on the merits-the wilful violation
standard,53 if adopted by the courts, would tend to inhibit the district court's
employment of the dismissal sanction without a closer examination of its ap-
propriateness under the particular circumstances of a case. Fear of reversal on
appeal unless the severe sanction was clearly warranted under the criterion
would temper the lower court's discretion at this stage of the proceedings.
It may be contended, nevertheless, that the use of the wilful violation standard
and the conditional order would be inadequate weapons to treat noncompliance
at the pre-trial conference phase. Neither device, it could be argued, would
serve as an adequate deterrent against non-wilful disregard of court orders. If
parties knew that they would have a second chance to comply so long as they
were not wilfully flouting the court's order, these measures would not promote
the desired due diligence in compliance. Where the end sought is attendance at
the conference, nonattendance, even if non-wilful, would still result in disrup-
tion of the court's calendar and perhaps a loss of the judge's services during
the time the conference was originally scheduled. But an alternative disposition
which will not prejudice a party's right to a trial on the merits is available to
promote compliance in the first instance. For a court may utilize disciplinary
actions against the party's attorney where the attorney is primarily responsible
for the noncompliance.54 Sanctions directed at a party's attorney have been
used, albeit infrequently, for noncompliance with orders of court at discovery
and the pre-trial conference stages, especially where the party did not know
and could not be expected to know that his attorney would prove derelict in his
duties. 5 In these cases, courts have been willing to disregard the lawyer-client
agency principle which provides that ordinarily parties are bound by the actions
53. See note 28 supra.
54. E.g., United Sheeplined Clothing Co. v. Arctic Fur Cap Corp., 165 F. Supp. 193
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (expenses charged against the attorney) ; Osolin v. S.S. Colorado, 1 FE!D.
RurLs Smv. 2d 37a.22, case 1 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 1958) (reasonable expenses and counsel
fees were charged against the attorney) ; Austin Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 22 F.R.D. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (cost incurred by defendants' attorneys in securing
order to compel compliance were charged against plaintiff's attorney); Allen v. United
States, 16 FED. Rurtxs SERv. 37b21, case 1 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 1951) (expenses charged
against the attorney). See also note 41 supra.
55. See notes 41 and 54 supra. Courts have not only wielded sanctions against the erring
attorney to prevent the visiting of the attorney's sins upon the unoffending client, but where
they have not directed a sanction against the lawyer, although he was at fault, they some-
times treat the party more leniently, as evidenced by the use of a conditional order of dis-
missal. Maresco v. Lambert, 2 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Dunn v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
96 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1951). See also, Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrioal
Discovery, 58 CoLUrm. L. REV. 480, 491 (1958).
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of their attorney.56 Thus where a party's failure to comply with an order call-
ing for the answering of interrogatories was due entirely to his attorney's dis-
regard of the court order, a court charged the expenses incurred by the oppos-
ing party in obtaining an order compelling compliance and counsel fees against
the erring attorney.57 And in Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.,58 where a party's
failure to comply with a local court rule requiring the timely filing of a pre-trial
memorandum was caused by his attorney's inadvertence, a fine was levied by
the lower court against the neglectful attorney. Although the Third Circuit
reversed,59 holding that a court has no power to fine an attorney 1,vho wag
neither held in contempt nor given a hearing, the lower court's reasoning re-
tains its vitality: where the attorney is clearly at fault, the unoffending party
should not suffer. Moreover, since the Supreme Court has not passed on the
constitutional propriety of a fine in such circumstances, 0° this measure is still
available in other circuits. In addition, alternative modes of discipline against
the attorney might include: (1) a reprimand by the court, (2) a finding of
contempt, or (3) a prohibition against practicing for a limited time before the
court whose order was neglected or disregarded. It seems fairly clear that the
judicious use of such measures would tend to promote attorney compliance in
the first instance.
56. For an expression of the lawyer-client agency principle, see Link v. Wabash R.R,,
370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962) : "Each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent
and is considered to have 'notice of all facts, notice of which call be charged upon the at-
torney.'"
57. Allen v. United States, 16 FED. RULES SERV. 37b.21, case I (E.D. Pa. May 21, 1951).
The court said:
Of course, the party is answerable for what his attorneys do or fail to do in the con-
duct of a suit, but in the present case it is undisputed that the respondent itself is not
actually to blame for the default, but that it was entirely due to the respondent's at-
torney's disregard of the court's order.
Id. at 507.
58. Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
59. Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1962), modifying 191 F. Supp.
763 (E.D. Pa. 1961), review denied sub nora. United States District Court for Eastern
Pa. v. Mahoney, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3152 (3d Cir. Nov. 6, 1962). The Court of Appeals in the
Gamble case, after indicating that "to impose such a penalty for conduct not found to be
contemptuous and without the procedural safeguards given by Rule 42 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure violates the Fifth Amendment," 307 F.2d at 731, said:
Absent authority, the district court's power to penalize appellant (the attorney)
is limited by contempt statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 401, and by Rule 42 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Section. 401 permits the district court to impose fines only for
specified conduct enumerated therein. If the conduct does not fall within the statute,
it has no such power....
Id. at 732. Thus, as the opinion indicates, a fine can- still be levied in the Third Circuit
against a noncomplying attorney; however, procedural safeguards-notice and a hearing-
must be provided for, and the conduct must fall within the terms of the statute in order for
the imposition of a fine to be upheld.
60. The Supreme Court denied review in the Gamble case on November 6, 1961, Sub
nom. United States District Court for Eastern Pa. v. Mahoney, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3152 (3d
Cir. Nov. 6, 1962).
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The following hypotheticals illustrate the application of the wilful violation
criterion and the suggested alternative sanctions that might be employed. (1)
Assume that an attorney receives notice a few weeks before a scheduled pre-
trial conference of an order to attend the pre-trial conference. Shortly there-
after, he misplaces the notice and consequently fails to attend the conference.
Under these circumstances, the noncompliance might be deemed to be non-
wilful. Accordingly, the court could employ a conditional order of dismissal,
and, at the same time, either reprimand the attorney or direct him to pay the
opposing party's counsel fees. Where a conditional order of dismissal is issued,
both the attorney and the client would be deemed to be fully apprised of the
consequences of any subsequent noncompliance. Where a failure to comply fol-
lowed, the court could then allow its drastic sanction to operate: the conditional
order would become final. (2) Assume that an attorney receives notice of a
scheduled conference, and without notifying his client, attends to other legal
business in another city on the day of the conference, thereby failing to attend
the scheduled conference. Though it might be said that the attorney is wilfully
flouting the court's order here, the lack of knowledge on the part of the client
of his attorney's misconduct should prevent the operation of the wilful violation
criterion under these circumstances. Reserving the use of the drastic sanction
of immediate dismissal, the court might employ the conditional dismissal, and,
at the same time, wield a more stringent sanction against the wilful attorney,
such as the imposition of the opposing party's counsel fees and a fine. (3)
Assume that an attorney receives notice of an order to attend a scheduled con-
ference, and notifies his client of the scheduled conference. Then on the day of
the conference the attorney and the client decide to play a game of golf at the
latter's country club. Under these circumstances, the wilful violation would be
established, and the court could appropriately employ an immediate dismissal
while levying a sanction against the attorney at the same time. Thus, in re-
sponse to the initial contention concerning the ineffectiveness of the alternative
dispositions available, it appears that the utilization of these three devices-
the wilful violation criterion, the conditional order of dismissal, and disciplinary
actions against an attorney-would serve as sufficient deterrents against non-
compliance with a court order at the pre-trial conference phase. Furthermore,
the employment of these devices, while fully heeding administrative concerns,
fulfills the central purpose of the Federal Rules-to provide a fair procedure
for the determination on the merits of rights of the parties.6 1
61. This latter contention was endorsed by the Second Circuit in Bardin v. Mondon,
298 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1961). Following the refusal of plaintiff's counsel to proceed at trial
on its scheduled date, the district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice on
grounds of want of prosecution. On appeal, the Second Circuit, holding that the lower court
did not abuse its discretion remanded the case with instructions that the action be dismissed
without prejudice on, condition that plaintiff's counsel pay all of the trial and appellate costs
taxed to the plaintiff and $100 in addition. Id. at 238. Acknowledging the tremendous cal-
endar problems faced by the Southern District of New York, the appellate court, neverthe-
less, did not approve the harsh sanction directed at the plaintiff by the lower court.
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As the Link case demonstrates, the law on the use of sanctions at the pre-
trial conference phase is developing without the establishment of clearly defined
standards. Rule 16 provides no assistance here; it neither mentions which sanc-
tions are available to the court nor furnishes any guidelines for their employ-
ment. Moreover, reliance upon Rule 41 (b) or resort to the concept of a court's
inherent power does not help a court to choose among the various sanctions
available. The Link case-highlighted by the drastic nature of the sanction, and
the direction of the sanction at an unknowing party who should not be deemed
responsible for the misconduct of his attorney-illustrates the need for judicial
thought on the subject of standards to govern the use of sanctions at the pre-
trial conference phase. The body of law in the discovery area provides a start-
ing point for the development of standards governing the use of sanctions for
noncompliance with orders of court issued pursuant to Rule 16.
